Iran and Venezuela have maintained a robust “strategic alliance” from the earliest days of the administrations of Presidents Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chávez.[1] The alliance has included shared rhetoric of solidarity between each states in opposition to a mutual adversary within the type of the USA, in addition to intensive cooperation in financial, diplomatic, and vitality spheres.[2] The sturdy ties between each states, regardless of the substantial geographic distance between them, are illustrated by odd moments and declarations throughout the relationship. Iranian airliner Mahan Air reestablished a direct flight to Caracas in April 2019 in defiance of Western sanctions on the agency’s operations and expressed hopes that the corporate might preserve this air path to Venezuela.[3] The Iranian Navy additionally introduced in December 2018 that it might deploy its new stealth destroyer and a small flotilla of warships to Venezuela to hold out a five-month expeditionary mission.[4]

Assessments of the Iran-Venezuela relationship have largely targeted on the partnership in the course of the Chávez and Ahmadinejad presidencies within the early 2000s. Moreover, these evaluations have primarily revolved round two viewpoints. One perspective portrays the alliance as a supplier of sensible, strategic advantages that allows each states to bypass worldwide sanctions and achieve economically from mutual cooperation. The opposite perspective frames the connection as an ideological one solely rooted in anti-Americanism that allows each states to amplify their opposition to the USA.[5] Nonetheless, the present literature on the connection lacks an up to date analysis of the alliance underneath the present-day administrations of President Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela and President Hassan Rouhani in Iran.

This paper seeks to fill this hole by presenting an up to date evaluation of the Iran-Venezuela alliance from 2013(when Maduro and Rouhani each assumed energy of their respective nations) to 2020. It seeks to reply the next query: to what extent can the persistence of present Iran-Venezuela relations into the Maduro-Rouhani period be defined by the anti-American sentiment that originated in the course of the Chávez-Ahmadinejad interval? This paper postulates that the intensification of U.S. most stress campaigns in opposition to each states have maintained the alliance’s orientation round an ideologically-driven anti-Americanism. It seeks to check this speculation by evaluating the incidence of high-level bilateral conferences between each nations’ leaders with the imposition of U.S. sanctions from 2013 to 2020.

This paper is split into a number of segments. It’ll first discover the literature on theories of alliance formation in worldwide relations and former analyses of the Ahmadinejad-Chávez period of the Iran-Venezuela alliance to find out underlying motivations for each nations’ alignment. The paper will then discover the methodology that it employs to evaluate the Iran-Venezuela alliance underneath Rouhani and Maduro. It’ll define the primary speculation, outline the scope and variables of the research, and clarify how the investigation will take a look at this speculation. It’ll then describe the outcomes of the evaluation and draw conclusions concerning the alliance within the Maduro-Rouhani period in addition to implications for U.S. coverage in the direction of each nations.

Literature Overview

The literature on the Iran-Venezuela alliance has established a group of theories and interpretations for the partnership’s creation; nevertheless, this paper seeks to contribute to it by gauging whether or not these works’ findings proceed to carry true even within the Maduro-Rouhani period. It seeks to discover whether or not the alliance extends past the personalities of Ahmadinejad and Chávez and depends on deeper structural elements that transcend anyone particular person chief.

Theories of Alliance Formation

Theories of alliance formation in worldwide relations broadly clarify the persistence of the Iran-Venezuela relationship. In an effort to perceive the theoretical foundation for this alliance’s creation, one should study the rationale and drivers behind the formation of alliances in worldwide relations. The research of the literature on alliance formation could yield helpful theoretical insights on why Iran and Venezuela have chosen to align with one another.

Stephen M. Walt presents a framework for alliance formation in his effort to make clear and enhance upon preexisting literature on neorealist principle in worldwide relations. In worldwide relations, states can select to both align with different weak companions to steadiness in opposition to a extra highly effective menace or bandwagon with this rising hegemon for self-preservation.[6]Walt, nevertheless, claims that conventional viewpoints in worldwide relations have framed this resolution solely in accordance with states’ consideration of relative energy. Walt opposes this framework and argues that states make these selections in line with essentially the most urgent threats to their survival relatively than simply pure assessments of the distribution energy within the worldwide enviornment. In his view, a state might ally with a extra highly effective one to comprise a comparatively weaker adversary if the latter posed an instantaneous menace to the state at hand.[7]

Walt goes additional to stipulate 4 elements that affect a state’s menace notion of potential adversaries: mixture energy, proximate energy, offensive energy, and offensive intentions. Mixture energy refers to a possible adversary’s complete sources on the financial, demographic, army, and technological ranges. Proximate energy refers back to the adversary’s menace based mostly on its distance from the state. Offensive energy refers to an adversary’s army functionality to straight threaten a state’s safety, whereas offensive intention refers to an adversary’s look as a menace based mostly on some formidable overseas coverage.[8]

Finally, Walt argues that between balancing and bandwagoning, states favor the previous as a result of a balancing coalition is much less vulnerable to defection as members would naturally search to withstand a threatening adversary for their very own safety.[9] Moreover, membership in such a coalition preserves a state’s independence, whereas bandwagoning utterly topics the state to the whim and preferences of a hegemon, which might change at any time.[10] Along with his emphasis on balancing, Walt prefers to border the institution of alliances by way of a “steadiness of menace” mannequin relatively than a steadiness of energy paradigm.

Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy current an alternate angle to Walt’s framework by analyzing motivations for alignment on the premise of a regime’s need for self-preservation at residence. In distinction to Walt’s clarification of a state’s alignment with others based mostly on exterior threats, Barnett and Levy argue that regimes typically prioritize their very own survival domestically first earlier than contemplating the state’s outdoors atmosphere. These regimes can both type alliances with different states to acquire the sources they should defend them at residence or put together their very own home belongings to fulfill challenges to their rule.[11] The shift to exterior alliances for inner safety is engaging to those regimes for various causes.

Alliances present the regime monetary support and army sources from its exterior companions that it couldn’t readily procure by itself, in addition to status if the allies have a famend ideological status.[12] As well as, reliance on exterior assist compensates for a regime’s weak army equipment and permits the federal government to pay attention its sources on home spending and elite patronage, which permits it to stay in energy. The regime wouldn’t should reallocate these sources to protection expenditures and threat the loyalty of its shoppers and supporters.[13]

Walt’s work on the steadiness of menace and the Barnett and Levy piece on home sources of alliance creation are each important as a result of they type the overall outlines for the colleges of thought on the Iran-Venezuela alignment talked about on this paper’s introduction. Walt’s arguments broadly conform to the “ideological” faculty, which emphasizes each nations’ fierce resentment in the direction of the USA and factors to a banner of revolutionary anti-Americanism unifying the companions. Barnett and Levy’s arguments, however, set the inspiration for the “pragmatism” faculty, which means that each states’ cooperation presents financial incentives to at least one one other and the means to keep away from worldwide sanctions.

Each Caracas and Tehran oppose the menace posed by the USA to their nations, given Washington’s appreciable international attain, intensive army sources, and its widespread financial affect that allows sanctions in opposition to Iran and Venezuela. Nonetheless, the regimes in these nations, which search to protect their rule, additionally understand the exterior menace of the USA as a direct problem to their very own survival along with the home opposition that these governments already face. Iran and Venezuela might be mentioned to have merged their curiosity in exterior protection in opposition to Washington with the regime curiosity in self-preservation, creating a novel overlap between state and regime’s pursuits. This overlap probably explains the Iran-Venezuela alignment however raises questions in regards to the alliance’s utility and the sensible advantages it supplies its members for the preservation of regime safety and state protection. 

The Iran-Venezuela Alliance underneath Ahmadinejad and Chávez

This paper argues that the present iteration of the alliance underneath Maduro and Rouhani continues to be outlined by an ideological anti-Americanism resulting from intense U.S. sanctions campaigns in opposition to each nations. In an effort to totally consider this argument, one should study earlier research of the connection underneath the 2 leaders’ predecessors, Chávez and Ahmadinejad. The findings from these research will set up the instructions and advantages that the alliance has already loved and might define doable continuities or adjustments that may seem within the interval of research. As well as, they’ll additionally confirm the motivations for alignment outlined within the articles on alliance formation.

One of the crucial broadly cited students on the connection is Elodie Brun, who presents a balanced account of the alliance that caters to each faculties of thought and explains the potential advantages that an alignment with Iran introduced Chávez’s overseas coverage. Brun argues that the Iran-Venezuela alliance enabled Chávez to pursue an unbiased overseas coverage that rejected cooperation with main powers resembling the USA and inspired creating states to emulate this similar plan of action.[14] She goes additional to state that each Chávez and Ahmadinejad’s overseas insurance policies converged round opposition in the direction of the USA and that the 2 nations’ sought interdependence with each other in 4 classes: political, army, financial, and cultural.[15] One of the crucial distinguished examples of the 2 nations’ cooperation occurred in 2005. Venezuela, underneath Chávez, vocalized diplomatic assist for Iran’s nuclear program and was the one nation to vote in opposition to an Worldwide Atomic Vitality Company (IAEA) decision that condemned Iran for its violation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).[16]           

Finally, Brun argues that these completely different interactions present that Chávez’s Venezuela admired Iran for its standing as an unbiased oil-exporter that fostered camaraderie with different creating nations. Each nations discovered widespread floor on a need to oppose the U.S.-dominated worldwide order and sought to emulate the non-alignment of the Third World that existed in the course of the Chilly Struggle.[17] Different students on the Iran-Venezuela alliance elaborate additional on the findings in Brun’s evaluation by presenting their very own interpretations of the partnership’s formation and upkeep, which might be grouped under in line with the varsity of thought. Whereas a lot of analyses exist on the Ahmadinejad-Chávez period of Iran-Venezuela relations, this literature evaluate consists of solely a choose pattern of those works resulting from comparable overlapping conclusions and interpretations that these items make with each other.

Arguments of the Pragmatist Faculty

Sean Goforth argues that the alliance’s formation is a response to Iran and Venezuela’s conclusion that neither nation might confront the USA alone. Go forth states that the alliance goals to make U.S. motion in opposition to both nation pricey and scale back Washington’s stress on the 2 companions. He argues for this declare by pointing to Venezuela’s oil exports to Iran in defiance of Western sanctions, Iranian monetary support to Venezuela, and the alleged presence of Hezbollah in Venezuela to hold out assaults in opposition to U.S. pursuits within the Western Hemisphere.[18] Goforth’s evaluation corresponds with the pragmatic faculty’s perception that the mutual financial positive aspects that Iran and Venezuela purchase from the connection additionally assist each nations dodge worldwide sanctions in opposition to them.

Whereas Brun and Goforth broadly spotlight the partnership’s financial and political benefits, Luis Fleischman analyzes its advantages from a strategic political-military perspective. Fleischman states that Iran sees Venezuela as an entry level into Latin America for Tehran to develop its army and political affect within the area and discover different like-minded companions to reduce its isolation.[19] He additionally claims that Venezuela values the connection as a result of it might study uneven warfare from Iran’s expertise on this space, given Tehran’s document of sponsoring sub-state teams throughout the Center East to advertise its affect within the area.[20] Fleischman’s arguments body the connection from a safety standpoint and spotlight its clandestine, gray-zone elements.

Arguments of the Ideological Faculty

Kavon Hakimzadeh argues that the alliance is pushed by each nations’ need for companions within the midst of worldwide isolation and the personalities of Ahmadinejad and Chávez. Nonetheless, Hakimzadeh largely dismisses the menace or significance posed by the partnership. He factors to a sequence of unfulfilled commerce agreements between each nations in gentle of their financial incompatibility with one another in addition to the ideological variations between their regimes. He finally concludes that the alliance will primarily revolve round anti-U.S. rhetoric however is not going to threaten Washington in any substantial method.[21] Hakimzadeh’s evaluation is important within the research of Iran-Venezuela relations as a result of his piece is among the most important on the alliance’s lack of utility, highlighting the ideological faculty’s pessimism in the direction of the importance of the partnership.

The latest research on the connection by Carmen Pereira Stallaert frames the alliance underneath Chávez and Ahmadinejad by way of the lens of peripheral-realism, an alternate mannequin of the realist faculty of thought in worldwide relations.[22] Stallaert sees Venezuela and Iran as insurgent states whose major motivation is to reject the U.S.-led worldwide order based mostly on their shared ideology of anti-Americanism.[23] This shared ideology is manifested of their diplomatic cooperation in multilateral our bodies such because the Group of Petroleum Exporting International locations (OPEC) and Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA). Her article additionally delves briefly into the way forward for the alliance underneath Maduro and Rouhani, however her evaluation summarizes an inventory of bilateral conferences relatively than assess the connection’s trajectory. Consequently, Stallaert’s piece underscores the necessity for an in-depth evaluation of the Maduro-Rouhani period of the alliance since its inception in 2013, which this paper seeks to cowl.

Fundamental Speculation and Observable Implications

This paper has now outlined the related literature on the Iran-Venezuela alliance and broadly mentioned the 2 faculties of thought on the bilateral relationship. It’ll now set up the speculation that this research seeks to broadly take a look at. This paper argues that the Maduro-Rouhani iteration of the alliance is defined by the ideological faculty and that each nations’ mutual opposition to the USA offers the companions an incentive to deepen their ties. This speculation broadly assumes that the enhancement of U.S. sanctions in opposition to each nations, notably underneath the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, offers each states widespread floor to rally round.[24] This research means that underneath the situations of this speculation, it might be widespread to see the next proportion of bilateral conferences between each states’ leaders to collectively denounce U.S. aggression, reaffirm the worth of the strategic alliance, and assist the home positions of one another’s regimes.[25]

The pragmatic faculty of thought argues that the Maduro-Rouhani partnership is motivated by strategic cooperation for mutual positive aspects in areas resembling commerce, worldwide petroleum markets, expertise, and diplomacy. These positive aspects can be used to assist each states keep away from sanctions. Below this faculty’s situations, this research additionally expects bilateral conferences wherein each nations’ high-ranking officers signal memorandums of understanding on financial cooperation, announce commerce offers, and pledge strategic cooperation in multilateral boards.[26] This pattern is vital to notice as a result of it’s doable that not each assembly examined by this research essentially entails an overt anti-American message. The paper examines each the timing of Iran-Venezuela conferences with U.S. sanctions in addition to the matters mentioned throughout these occasions.

Analysis Methodology

To check the primary speculation, the research examines high-level bilateral conferences between Iranian and Venezuelan officers between 2013 and 2020 and compares their incidence with the imposition of U.S. sanctions in opposition to each nations. The paper tracks the variety of events each nations hosted a gathering within the wake of the announcement of a U.S. sanction in opposition to both Iran or Venezuela. As well as, it additionally retains monitor of the matters mentioned in every assembly.  The logic of this method, in accordance with the speculation that Caracas and Tehran’s anti-Americanism drives the alliance, means that hardline U.S. habits in the direction of each nations would compel them to fulfill incessantly to debate these provocations and reaffirm the connection.

This research used the Iran Mission, a web site managed by unbiased Iranian journalists to gather Iranian media information releases, to trace Iran-Venezuela conferences that occurred between 2013 to 2020. The web site accommodates a search tag labelled “Iran-Venezuela Ties” that compiles all Iranian information studies associated to the bilateral relationship.[27] This paper reviewed all the content material inside this class, chosen any studies that described a high-level bilateral assembly between each nations’ officers and proceeded to seek out the press releases from their authentic Iranian media sources.[28] The Iran Mission constitutes essentially the most appropriate supply of knowledge for this investigation as a result of Western shops such because the New York Occasions or the Wall Road Journal sporadically cowl the Iran-Venezuela relationship. As a result of the Iran Mission studies on matters associated to Iranian home and overseas coverage, the existence of an Iran-Venezuela class in its archives demonstrates its dedication to a dependable, constant supply of knowledge on the bilateral relationship.

The vast majority of the high-level bilateral conferences comprised bodily meet ups between important authorities officers from each nations in both Caracas or Tehran or in the course of the course of a bigger worldwide convention such because the United Nations Common Meeting. This paper defines a “high-level assembly” as any in-person operate involving the heads of state of both nation, overseas ministers, chiefs of assorted financial companies or industries, and different miscellaneous ministry officers. In these conferences, the officers would typically focus on common matters such because the enhancement of bilateral relations, pledges of financial cooperation, and joint denunciations of the USA.

The research excludes public statements issued by authorities spokespersons or high-level officers in both nation outdoors of the context of a gathering, resembling a press convention or social media put up, for 2 causes. First, the conveyance of such statements verbally or digitally with no assembly can be a standard response by both nation to any sanction imposed by the USA.[29] It’s extremely probably {that a} majority of sanctions from the USA would already be met with vital public statements from both nation. This research assumes {that a} public assertion outdoors of a gathering is a continuing variable with no important bearing on how the bilateral relationship might be characterised. For the second purpose for these statements’ exclusion, a high-level assembly entails a substantial quantity of vitality and sources to arrange and wouldn’t be as frequent because the supply of a public assertion. Leaders from each nations would journey lengthy distances to fulfill with each other, whereas preliminary working-level discussions and planning would most likely happen weeks earlier than the precise meet as much as set up an agenda, decide a location, and schedule a time. The substantial effort behind this setup implies that each nations’ officers would worth the connection to the purpose of assembly bodily regardless of lengthy distances and worldwide stress.[30]

This research expects that a lot of the Iran-Venezuela bilateral conferences would happen inside one month of any U.S. sanction levied in opposition to both nation, given these assumptions that the procedures to determine the conferences would take a big period of time. To account for extraneous variables resembling time-zone variations, logistical difficulties with assembly preparations, or delays in reporting on the conferences, the paper added a interval of 1 to 3 days to this month-long interval.

As soon as the research tracked all the doable Iran-Venezuela conferences that occurred between 2013-2020, it proceeded to search for U.S. sanctions introduced in opposition to both nation earlier than every assembly occurred, utilizing the one-month hole to slim the search. The research regarded by way of sanctions timelines and studies from sources resembling the USA Institute of Peace, the Congressional Analysis Service, the U.S. State Division, and Econ Americas.[31] It recognized sanctions occurring on this seven-year interval and in contrast them in opposition to these conferences. Examples of those components embrace asset freezes of state firms resembling Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), restrictions on these nations’ main exports and imports, and sanctions focusing on particular regime officers in each nations, amongst others. This research largely included each major and secondary sanctions to cowl the complete spectrum of doable designations that would probably immediate an Iran-Venezuela assembly.

This paper largely excluded sanctions that concentrate on Iran’s varied proxies. Whereas the Trump administration doesn’t discriminate between the actions of Iran’s proxies and people of Tehran,[32] this paper didn’t embrace anti-proxy sanctions due to the notion that some shoppers retain a point of autonomy vis-à-vis Iran.[33] Not each motion carried out by an Iranian proxy could essentially stem from a direct command from Tehran, suggesting that these shoppers possess their very own agendas when conducting actions.[34] Consequently, a possible hyperlink between an Iran Venezuela assembly and sanctions in opposition to one in all Iran’s proxies wouldn’t be probably due to an official degree of deniability between Iran and its shoppers.[35]

After researching details about all doable Iran-Venezuela conferences and U.S. sanctions between 2013-2020, the paper discovered a complete of twenty-five conferences inside this era. It then divided all the conferences broadly between people who occurred inside one month of the imposition of a U.S. sanction and people who didn’t. For all conferences that occurred throughout the one month time-frame, it additionally tracked the primary matters mentioned by the attendees, resembling enhancement of bilateral ties, joint declarations in opposition to the USA, and financial cooperation.[36] On this method, the research hoped to seek out whether or not some connection existed between the matters mentioned on the conferences and the U.S. sanctions. The total timeline of all the bilateral conferences, in addition to the corresponding sanctions that probably triggered those that occurred inside a month of a sanctions enactment, might be discovered within the appendix on the finish of this paper.

The next variety of conferences occurring inside one month of enactment would recommend a doable pattern between U.S. sanctions and the will of each nations to fulfill bodily, probably supporting the ideological faculty speculation. Extra conferences centered on dialogue about joint opposition to the U.S. or augmentation of the bilateral relationship would additionally appear to lend credence to this pattern. The general analysis methodology primarily targeted on testing the ideological faculty speculation, however the research additionally hoped to briefly study whether or not a choose few financial agreements at a few of these conferences had been fulfilled. Any realization of those agreements might probably recommend the validity of the pragmatic faculty’s speculation.

Investigation Outcomes

The graph under summarizes the findings of the investigation. Determine 1 charts the variety of bilateral conferences that occurred anytime inside a month of a U.S. sanctions announcement.

Evaluation         

Out of the twenty-five bilateral conferences that occurred between 2013 to 2020, sixteen occurred inside one month of any U.S. sanction levied in opposition to both nation, marking 64% of all these conferences. Inside these sixteen conferences, a near-even cut up developed between all three classes (denunciation of the U.S., financial cooperation, and improve in bilateral ties). Six of those sixteen conferences broadly targeted on the enhancement of bilateral ties, whereas the remaining two classes of financial cooperation and anti-U.S. declarations every constituted 5 conferences.

These findings spotlight a number of common tendencies almost about Iran-Venezuela relations. At first look, it seems that round three-fifths of the conferences within the 2013-2020 interval occurred inside a month of U.S. sanctions implementation. Whereas this proportion could appear important, it’s primarily coincidental and correlational. Not one of the Iranian press releases report officers from both nation explicitly stating their intention to assemble due to the particular U.S. sanction that occurred to happen previous to the assembly. Even throughout conferences that particularly denounced U.S. aggression, the officers current in these gatherings made these bellicose remarks irrespective of a selected sanction.

For instance, on June 30, 2018, Venezuelan Overseas Minister Jorge Arreaza met with Iranian Deputy Overseas Minister Morteza Sarmadi in Caracas, the place Arreaza expressed sympathy for Iran’s battle with the USA and pledged Venezuela’s assist for Tehran in opposition to U.S. sanctions.[37] About a number of days prior, on June 27, 2018, the USA Workplace of Overseas Property Management stripped away business licenses that might have permitted firms to promote airliner tools and instruments to Iran.[38] No less than in line with the corresponding press report, at no level in the course of the July 1 assembly did Arreaza or Sarmadi point out these explicit sanctions proscribing airliner exports to Iran. This situation reveals that whereas the incidence of a gathering solely day from a selected sanction’s implementation is suspect and notable, there isn’t any direct causal proof to attach these two occasions. Whereas 63% of all the out there Iran-Venezuela conferences occurred inside relative time proximity of a U.S. sanction, this pattern tentatively suggests a doable relationship between the enactment of a U.S. sanction and the choice for Iranian and Venezuelan leaders to fulfill bodily.

Different Evaluation: Comply with-Up Agreements          

To discover the connection additional and dive into the assumptions of the pragmatist faculty of thought, which assumes that Iranian and Venezuelan leaders fulfilled any financial agreements reached at a gathering on a later date, the paper chosen a number of bilateral conferences to determine the standing of agreements from these conferences. One case revolved round two conferences discovered throughout the pattern of gatherings that occurred inside one month of U.S. sanctions. On April 7, 2018, Venezuelan Overseas Minister Jorge Arreaza and Iranian Minister of Well being Dr. Seyyed Hasan Ghazizadeh signed a memorandum of understanding wherein Iran would export prescribed drugs to Venezuela and assist practice Venezuelans on this area.[39] On February 23, 2019, Iran’s Meals and Drug Administration Chief Mehdi Pirsalehi introduced in a gathering with Venezuelan Deputy Overseas Minister Ruben Dario Molina that Iran was now ready to export drugs and different medical provides to Venezuela as a part of the sooner memorandum in April 2018.[40] This paper tried to seek out different information releases that confirmed that these exports had begun however discovered little or no follow-up data on this matter. It might solely discover one Iranian information launch that said that the chairman of Iran’s Meals and Drugs Group had verified that the nation was exporting prescribed drugs to Venezuela.[41] Nonetheless, as a result of this explicit information launch occurred solely two days after Pirsalehi’s authentic announcement contained ambiguous language, it was unclear if these exports had truly occurred.

This explicit situation with the April 2018 and February 2019 conferences present that each nations are able to following up on financial agreements and discussing points outdoors of the sphere of anti-Americanism. It lends some credence to the pragmatist faculty of each nations discovering mutual positive aspects economically or materially. Nonetheless, further research must be carried out sooner or later to extensively discover the final word outcomes of memorandums or agreements from these conferences and additional validate this speculation.

Total, the findings offered on this research don’t definitively verify the primary assumption that U.S. sanctions essentially set off conferences between Iranian and Venezuelan leaders. Though practically 60% of those conferences coincided carefully with the imposition of a U.S. sanction, this research can solely recommend this pattern as strictly correlational since state officers at these gatherings could not explicitly state their true intention for gathering. Extra research must be carried out to watch future Iran-Venezuela bilateral conferences and their matters of dialogue, in addition to any corresponding U.S. sanctions, in an effort to set up clearer relationships between the variables concerned.

Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Coverage in Latin America and Past

Regardless of questions surrounding the true relationship between U.S. sanctions and Iran-Venezuela conferences, the existence of twenty-five of those occasions all through the Maduro-Rouhani period reveals that the connection continues to be comparatively lively even past the administrations of Chávez and Ahmadinejad. The conferences’ discussions of all kinds of matters from financial cooperation to anti-U.S. sentiment recommend that each nations discover some goal of their engagement and that there’s a foundation for the connection past management personalities.

The Iran-Venezuela relationship is a vital one to check relative to broader U.S.-Iran competitors as a result of Iran believes that its outreach to “peripheral” states permits the nation to seek out allies that share in Tehran’s anti-Americanism and again Iran economically and diplomatically in its battle with Washington.[42] Brandon Fite and Chloe Coughlin-Schulte state that Venezuela is Iran’s most ardent ally on this regard,[43] whereas Norman Bailey labels Venezuela as Iran’s “beachhead” in Latin America for Tehran to determine deeper financial and diplomatic ties with nations of the area.[44]

Iran finds itself surrounded in its speedy residence area by pro-U.S. adversaries resembling Israel and Saudi Arabia, which spend extra on their militaries than Tehran.[45] Moreover, round three dozen U.S. army bases are located across the nation, including further stress on the Islamic Republic.[46] Within the midst of Iran’s army mismatch with its adversaries in its personal neighborhood, it is going to be attention-grabbing to look at how Iran turns to geographically distant allies like Venezuela to deal with rising diplomatic, financial, and army stress from Washington. Such outreach implies additional Iranian entrenchment in Latin America because the Islamic Republic mockingly turns to an space throughout the conventional U.S. sphere of affect for assist to counter U.S containment in Tehran’s personal geographic locale. Washington typically fears the opening offered to extraterritorial adversaries in Latin America by the decay of the rule of regulation and stability within the space.[47] Consequently, the USA ought to proceed to watch the Iran-Venezuela bilateral relationship and its future trajectory for a greater understanding of Iran’s general ambitions in Latin America and its counter-sanctions technique overseas.

Bibliography

An Act to Prolong the Termination of Sanctions with Respect to Venezuela underneath the Venezuela Protection of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014. Public Legislation 114-194.U.S. Statutes at Massive 130 (2016): 674. https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ194/PLAW-        114publ194.pdf

Bailey, Norman A. “Iran’s Venezuelan Gateway.” The American Overseas Coverage Council.             February 2012. https://www.afpc.org/uploads/documents/ISB5.pdf

Barnett, Michael N. and Jack S. Levy. “Home Sources of Alliances and Alignments: Th Case of Egypt, 1962-73.” Worldwide Group 45, no. 3 (Summer season, 1991): 369-395.

Brun, Elodie. “Iran’s Place in Venezuela’s Overseas Coverage.” In Iran in Latin America: Menace orAxis of Annoyance’?, edited by Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, and Adam Stubits, 35-49. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Worldwide Heart for Students, 2009.

Calderon, Silvia and Mirya R. Holman. “Sharing the Identical Demons: The Venezuelan-Iranian Alliance and their Anti-U.S. Ideology.” Faurj 3, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 47-56..

Countering America’s Adversaries Via Sanctions Act. Public Legislation 115-44.U.S. Statutes at Massive 131 (2017): 886-955. https://www.congress.gov/115/plaws/publ44/PLAW-            115publ44.pdf

Delgado, Antonio Maria. “Will Iran Warships in Venezuela Trigger Alarm? That is Going to             Hassle Neighboring International locations.” Miami Herald. December 8, 2018. https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/venezuela/article22284            3240.html

Division of Protection. United States Southern Command Technique: Enduring Promise for the Americas. Might 8, 2019       https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/SOUTHCOM_Strategy_2019.pdf?ver=2   019-05-15-131647-353

Dogantekin, Vakkas. “Iran Surrounded by Dozens of US Bases as Tensions Develop.” Anadolu Company. January 8, 2020. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-surrounded-by-            dozens-of-us-bases-as-tension-grows/1696692

Escudé, Carlos. Realismoperiférico: fundamentos para la nuevapolítica exterior argentina. Planeta, 1992

“Government Order 13808 of August 24, 2017: Imposing Further Sanctions with Respect to the   State of affairs in Venezuela.” Federal Register 82, no. 166 (August 29, 2017): 41155-41156.             https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13808.pdf

“Government Order 13827 of March 19, 2018: Taking Further Steps to Deal with the State of affairs in Venezuela.” Federal Register 83, no. 55 (March 21, 2018): 12469-12470.             https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/13827.pdf

“Government Order 13850 of November 1, 2018: Blocking Property of Further Individuals Contributing to the State of affairs in Venezuela.” Federal Register 83, no. 213 (November 2, 2018): 55243-55245.   https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/sanctions/Programs/Documents/venezuela_eo_1            3850.pdf

“Factbox: Venezuela’s Ties with Iran.” Reuters. January 7, 2012.             https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-iran/factbox-venezuelas-ties-with-iran-    idUSTRE8060DO20120107

Fassihi, Farnaz. “Iran Greets Newest U.S. Sanctions with Mockery.” The New York Occasions. June 24, 2019.https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/world/middleeast/iran-sanctions-            response.html

Fite, Brandon and Chloe Couhglin-Schulte. “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competitors: The Affect of Latin America, Africa, and the Peripheral States.” Heart for Strategic and             Worldwide Research, Burke Chair in Technique. July 9, 2013. https://csis-    prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/recordsdata/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_            XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf

Fleischman, Luis. Latin America within the Put up-Chávez Period: The Safety Menace to the United States. Lincoln, NE: College of Nebraska Press, 2013.

Goforth, Sean. Axis of Unity: Venezuela, Iran, and the Menace to America. Lincoln, NE: College of Nebraska Press, 2012.

Gómez, Paz. “A Timeline of US Sanctions on the Venezuelan Regime.” Econ Americas. June 3, 2019. https://econamericas.com/2019/06/us-sanctions-venezuela/

Hafezi, Parisa. “Iran, Venezuela in ‘Axis of Unity’ In opposition to U.S.” Reuters. July 2, 2007. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-venezuela/iran-venezuela-in-axis-of-unity-            against-u-s-idUSDAH23660020070702

Hakimzadeh, Kavon. “Iran and Venezuela: The ‘Axis of Annoyance.’” Army Overview 89, no. 3 (Might-June 2009): 78-84.

“Iran and Venezuela Deepen ‘Strategic Alliance.’” BBC Information. October 21, 2010/             https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11593197

“Iran Assault: U.S. Sanctions High Officers, Metals.” U.S. Institute of Peace. January 10, 2020.   https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jan/10/iran-attack-us-sanctions-top-officials-metals

“Iran Exports Drugs to Venezuela.” Iran Worldwide. February 25, 2019.   https://iranintl.com/en/iran-in-brief/iran-exports-medicine-venezuela

“Iran Prepared for Full Industrial Cooperation with Venezuela: Minister.” Islamic Republic Information Company. December 21, 2013. https://en.irna.ir/news/80961914/Iran-ready-for-full-            industrial-cooperation-with-Venezuela-minister

“Iran Able to Export Drugs, Medical Gear to Venezuela.” Mehr Information Company. February 23, 2019.https://en.mehrnews.com/news/142811/Iran-ready-to-export-            medicine-medical-equipment-to-Venezuela

“Iran Sanctions.” U.S. Division of State. https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions/

“Iran Helps Measures Aimed toward Stabilizing Oil Market: Rouhani.” The Iran Mission. October23, 2016.https://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/10/23/iran-supports-measures-aimed-            stabilizing-oil-market-rouhani/

“Iran Helps Venezuela in OPEC: FM.” Islamic Republic Information Company. April 21, 2015.            https://en.irna.ir/news/81579141/Iran-supports-Venezuela-in-OPEC-FM.

“Iran Urges Nearer Ties with Venezuela.” The Iran Mission. June 16, 2014.             https://theiranproject.com/blog/2014/06/16/iran-urges-closer-ties-with-venezuela/.

“Iran-Venezuela Ties,” The Iran Mission, https://theiranproject.com/blog/tag/iran-venezuela-ties/

“Iran, Venezuela Get pleasure from Shut Stance on Oil Sector: Zangeneh.” Shana. February 3, 2016.            https://en.shana.ir/news/254640/Iran-Venezuela-Enjoy-Close-Stance-on-Oil-Sector-            Zangeneh

“Iran, Venezuela FMs Focus on Bilateral Ties in Tehran.” Mehr Information Company. January 20, 2020.   https://en.mehrnews.com/news/154751/Iran-Venezuela-FMs-discuss-bilateral-ties-in-       Tehran

“Iran, Venezuela FMs Focus on Main Int’l, Regional Points.” Islamic Republic Information Company. September 27, 2018.https://en.irna.ir/news/83046768/Iran-Venezuela-FMs-discuss-            major-int-l-regional-issues

“Iran, Venezuela Ink Pharmaceutical MoU.” Mehr Information Company. April 8, 2018.            https://en.mehrnews.com/news/133217/Iran-Venezuela-ink-pharmaceutical-MoU

“Iran, Venezuela Should Work to Broaden Pleasant Ties: Zarif.” The Iran Mission. August 28 2016.https://theiranproject.com/blog/2016/08/28/iran-venzuela-must-work-broaden-            friendly-ties-zarif/

“Iran, Venezuela Stress Creating Bilateral Ties.” Iranian College students’ Information Company. August 16, 2016.https://en.isna.ir/news/95050116256/Iran-Venezuela-stress-developing-bilateral-         ties

“Iran, Venezuela Welcome Any Measure to Stabilize Oil Market: Min.” Shana. September 13, 2017.https://en.shana.ir/news/278580/Iran-Venezuela-Welcome-any-Measure-to-            Stabilize-Oil-Market

“Iran’s Zarif, Venezuelan Deputy Overseas Minister Meet in Tehran.” Tasnim Information Company.            March 2, 2014. https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2014/03/02/300590/iran-s-zarif-   venezuelan-deputy-foreign-minister-meet-in-tehran

“Iran, Venezuela Look to ‘Deepen’ Ties.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. November 4, 2020.   https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-venezuela-look-to-deepen-ties/30930603.html

“Iranian, Venezuelan Protection Ministers Focus on Complete Coop. Street Map.” Mehr Information Company. January 11, 2019.https://en.mehrnews.com/news/141397/Iranian-Venezuelan-    defense-ministers-discuss-comprehensive-coop.

“Iranian, Venezuelan FMs Stress Growth of all-out Ties.” Islamic Republic Information Company. April 16, 2016.https://en.irna.ir/news/82037945/Iranian-Venezuelan-FMs-stress-            expansion-of-all-out-ties

Kajjo, Sirwan, Mehdi Jedinia, and EzeelSahinkya. “Why did Iran’s IRGC, Not its Proxies,             Assault US Bases in Iraq?” Voice of America. January 9, 2020.             https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/why-did-irans-irgc-not-its-proxies-attack- us-bases-iraq

Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran Sanctions.” Congressional Analysis Service. Up to date April 14, 2020.   https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf

Pompeo, Michael R. “Confronting Iran: The Trump Administration’s Technique.” Overseas Affairs 97, no. 6 (November/December 2018): 60-70.

“President Rouhani Requires Growth of Ties with Venezuela.” Islamic Republic Information Company. September 17, 2016.https://en.irna.ir/news/82232756/President-Rouhani-calls-   for-expansion-of-ties-with-Venezuela

Ribando, Clare Seelke. “Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions.” Congressional Analysis Service. Up to date February 21, 2020. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf

“Rouhani Requires Stronger Tehran-Caracas Ties.” Mehr Information Company. September 10, 2017.             https://en.mehrnews.com/news/127668/Rouhani-calls-for-stronger-Tehran-Caracas-ties

“Rouhani: Iran Favors Shut, Strategic Ties with Latin America.” Islamic Republic Information Company. August 4, 2014.https://en.irna.ir/news/2733146/Rouhani-Iran-favors-close-            strategic-ties-with-Latin-America.

“Rouhani Praises Resistance of Iranian, Venezuelan Nations.” Islamic Republic Information Company.  October 25, 2019.https://en.irna.ir/news/83530226/Rouhani-praises-resistance-of-            Iranian-Venezuelan-nations

“Rouhani Desires Iran-Venezuela Tight Cooperation In opposition to Falling Crude Costs.” The Iran Mission. January 10, 2015.https://theiranproject.com/blog/2015/01/10/rouhani-wants- iran-venezuela-tight-cooperation-against-falling-crude-prices/.

“Sanctions In opposition to PDVSA and Venezuela Oil Sector.” U.S. Division of State. January 28, 2019.https://www.state.gov/sanctions-against-pdvsa-and-venezuela-oil-sector/

“Sanctions Announcement on Iran.” U.S. Division of State, Workplace of the Spokesperson.             November 20, 2018.https://www.state.gov/sanctions-announcement-on-iran/

Sharafedin, Bozorgmehr. “Iran’s Mahan Air Launches Direct Flights to Venezuela.” Reuters. April 8, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-venezuela-airlines/irans-mahan-air-      launches-direct-flights-to-venezuela-idUSL8N21Q11T

Stallaert, Carmen Pereira. “The Strategic Alliance Between Chávez and Ahmadinejad, and its Affect on Worldwide Establishments, from a Peripheral-Realist Perspective.” Portuguese      Journal of Social Science 17, no. 2 (2018): 179-197.

Starr, Jason and HeliaIghani. “Timeline of U.S. Sanctions,” United States Institute of Peace: Iran Primer. Up to date September 2019. https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-     sanctions

Stavljanin, Dragan and Pete Baumgartner. “Persian May: How Sturdy is Iran’s Army?’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. January 9, 2020. https://www.rferl.org/a/persian-            might-a-look-at-tehran-s-military-capability-amid-the-u-s–iranian-            conflict/30368967.html

Taylor, Adam. “What Coronavirus? With Indictment of Venezuela’s Maduro and Sanctions on        Iran, Doubles Down on ‘Most Strain.’” The Washington Put up. March 27, 2020.   https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/maduro-indictment-maximum-      pressure-coronavirus-trump-venezuela/2020/03/26/82809364-6f86-11ea-a156-   0048b62cdb51_story.html.

“Tehran, Caracas Oil Ministers Meet in Tehran.” Shana. February 8, 2017.            https://en.shana.ir/news/275626/Tehran-Caracas-Oil-Ministers-Meet-in-Tehran

“Treasury Sanctions Firms Promoting, Buying, and Enabling Iranian Petrochemical             Merchandise.” U.S. Division of the Treasury. October 29, 2020.             https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1168

“Treasury Targets Venezuela Forex Trade Community Scheme Producing Billions of             {Dollars} for Corrupt Regime Insiders.” U.S. Division of the Treasury. January 8, 2019.   https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm583

“Trump Imposes Journey Ban on ‘Senior Iranian Officers’ and Household Members.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. September 26, 2019.https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-travel-ban-     iranian-senior-government-officials/30184344.html

“The US Imposes Sanctions on Chinese language Firms for Transporting Iranian Oil.” U.S. Division of State. September 25, 2019.https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-            imposes-sanctions-on-chinese-companies-for-transporting-iranian-oil/

“The US Imposes Sanctions on Venezuelan People and Entities.” U.S. Division of State, Workplace of the Spokesperson. September 25, 2018.https://www.state.gov/the-            united-states-imposes-sanctions-on-venezuelan-individuals-and-entities/

“US Imposes New Sanctions on Iran.” U.S. Institute of Peace. February 3, 2017.             https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/feb/03/us-imposes-new-sanctions-iran

“US Pressures Alternative for Iran, Venezuela to Additional Enhance Mutual Ties.” Mehr Information Company. August 6, 2017.https://en.mehrnews.com/news/126924/US-pressures-            opportunity-for-Iran-Venezuela-to-further-boost

“US Sanctions Iranian Hacking Community.” U.S. Institute of Peace. March 23, 2018.            https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/mar/23/us-sanctions-iran-hacking-network

“U.S. Sanctions Thai Firm Related to Iran Airline.” U.S. Institute of Peace. September 14, 2018.https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2018/sep/14/us-sanctions-thai-company-            connected-iran-airline

“Venezuela Requires Boosting Strategic Cooperation with Iran.” Fars Information Company. December       3, 2018.https://en.farsnews.ir/newstext.aspx?nn=13970912000724

Venezuela Protection of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014. Public Legislation 113-278.U.S. Statutes at Massive 128 (2014): 3011-3016.             https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ278/PLAW-113publ278.pdf

“Venezuela Denounces New US Sanctions as ‘Menace’ to World.” Al Jazeera.August 6, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/venezuela-denounces-sanctions-threat-world- 190806161739416.html

“Venezuela Hails Iran’s Combat In opposition to US’ Hegemony.” Iran Entrance Web page Information. June 30, 2018.   https://ifpnews.com/venezuela-hails-irans-fight-against-us-hegemony

“Venezuela-Associated Sanctions.” U.S. Division of State. https://www.state.gov/venezuela-      related-sanctions/

Walt, Stephen M. “Alliance Formation and the Steadiness of World Energy.” Worldwide Safety 9, no. 4 (Spring, 1985): 3-43.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Idea of Worldwide Politics. Studying, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Firm, 1979.

Wasser, Becca and Ariane Tabatabai. “Iran’s Community of Fighters within the Center East Aren’t At all times Loyal to Iran.” The Washington Put up, Might 21, 2019.            https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/21/how-do-irans-proxies-actually-          work/.

“Zarif, Venezuelan Deputy FM Focus on Bilateral Ties in Tehran.” Mehr Information Company. February  24, 2019.https://en.mehrnews.com/news/142841/Zarif-Venezuelan-deputy-FM-discuss-           bilateral-ties-in-Tehran

“Zarif, Venezuelan Counterpart Focus on Bilateral Points in Tehran.” Mehr Information Company. April 7,           2018.https://en.mehrnews.com/news/133189/Zarif-Venezuelan-counterpart-discuss-           bilateral-issues-in-Tehran

Notes

[1]See “Iran and Venezuela Deepen ‘Strategic Alliance,’” BBC Information, October 21, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-11593197.Throughout a two-day go to to Iran, Chávez and Ahmadinejad pledged to consolidate the Iran-Venezuela “strategic alliance” and problem the U.S.-led worldwide liberal order.

[2] For extra data on Iran-Venezuela cooperation in several spheres of curiosity, see “Factbox: Venezuela’s Ties with Iran,” Reuters, January 7, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-iran/factbox-venezuelas-ties-with-iran-idUSTRE8060DO20120107

[3]BozorgmehrSharafedin, “Iran’s Mahan Air Launches Direct Flights to Venezuela,” Reuters, April 8, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/iran-venezuela-airlines/irans-mahan-air-launches-direct-flights-to-venezuela-idUSL8N21Q11T.

[4] Antonio Maria Delgado, “Will Iran Warships in Venezuela Trigger Alarm? That is Going to Hassle Neighboring International locations,” Miami Herald, December 8, 2018, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/venezuela/article222843240.html

[5]See Silvia Calderon and Mirya R. Holman, “Sharing the Identical Demons: The Venezuelan-Iranian Alliance and their Anti-U.S. Ideology,” Faurj3, no.1 (Spring 2014): 48-49. The article’s literature evaluate broadly outlines the 2 foremost faculties of thought within the Iranian-Venezuelan relationship. This paper will use these two faculties as the premise for the hypotheses it’s going to take a look at later within the research.

[6]See Kenneth N. Waltz, Idea of Worldwide Politics (Studying, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Firm, 1979), 126-127. Waltz’s work outlines the key concepts and rules of the neorealist faculty of thought in worldwide relations.

[7]Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Steadiness of World Energy,” Worldwide Safety 9, no. 4 (Spring, 1985): 8-9.

[8] Ibid., 9-12.

[9]Ibid., 13.

[10]Ibid., 15.

[11]Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, “Home Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73,” Worldwide Group 45, no. 3 (Summer season, 1991): 373-374.

[12]Ibid., 374.

[13]Ibid., 374-376.

[14]Elodie Brun, “Iran’s Place in Venezuela’s Overseas Coverage,” in Iran in Latin America: Menace or ‘Axis of Annoyance’?, ed. Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, and Adam Stubits (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Worldwide Heart for Students, 2009), 36.

[15]Ibid., 38-39.

[16] Ibid.,40.

[17]Ibid., 45.

[18]Sean Goforth, Axis of Unity: Venezuela, Iran, and the Menace to America (Lincoln, NE: College of Nebraska Press, 2012), 148-149.

[19]Luis Fleischman, Latin America within the Put up-Chávez Period: The Safety Menace to the USA (Lincoln, NE: College of Nebraska Press, 2013), 114-115.

[20] Ibid., 134.

[21]Kavon Hakimzadeh, “Iran and Venezuela: The ‘Axis of Annoyance,’ Army Overview 89, no. 3 (Might-June 2009): 83-84.

[22] See Escudé, Carlos. Realismoperiférico: fundamentos para la nuevapolítica exterior argentina. Planeta, 1992.Escudé outlines a principle of worldwide relations known as Peripheral Realism, which partitions the worldwide system between three courses: rule-makers, rule-takers, and rebels. Rule-makers are highly effective states that generate the norms and legal guidelines of the worldwide system. Rule-takers are states that conform to those precepts. Rebels are states that refuse to simply accept the system established by the rule-makers and actively search to undermine it.

[23]Carmen Pereira Stallaert, “The Strategic Alliance Between Chávez and Ahmadinejad, and its Affect on Worldwide Establishments, from a Peripheral-Realist Perspective,” Portuguese Journal of Social Science 17, no. 2 (2018): 184.

[24] See Adam Taylor, “What Coronavirus? With Indictment of Venezuela’s Maduro and Sanctions on Iran, Doubles Down on ‘Most Strain,’” The Washington Put up, March 27, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/maduro-indictment-maximum-pressure-coronavirus-trump-venezuela/2020/03/26/82809364-6f86-11ea-a156-0048b62cdb51_story.html. All through the COVID-19 pandemic, the Trump administration tightened sanctions on states resembling Iran and Venezuela regardless of criticisms of those insurance policies’ results on these nations’ public well being responses, demonstrating the administration’s dedication to an unrelenting sanctions marketing campaign in opposition to each nations.

[25] See Parisa Hafezi, “Iran, Venezuela in ‘Axis of Unity’ In opposition to U.S.,” Reuters, July 2, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-venezuela/iran-venezuela-in-axis-of-unity-against-u-s-idUSDAH23660020070702. When Chávez visited Ahmadinejad in Iran in 2007, the Venezuelan chief declared that Caracas and Tehran would collectively “defeat the imperialism of North America.” Iranian media labelled the Iran-Venezuela relationship as an “axis of unity” all through the go to. Such rhetoric could also be commonplace in bilateral conferences between each nations within the Maduro-Rouhani period.

[26]See Iran-Venezuela Factbox article on quotation 2.

[27] “Iran-Venezuela Ties,” The Iran Mission, https://theiranproject.com/blog/tag/iran-venezuela-ties/. The Iran Mission was extremely helpful as a result of it gathered and referenced all Iranian information releases, from each state and unbiased companies, concerning Iran-Venezuela conferences in a single place. The research proceeded to search for the unique information releases of their respective sources, however the Iran Mission pointed to the existence of those studies and narrowed the seek for this data significantly.

[28]A few of the authentic Iranian information releases reported on the Iran Mission couldn’t be discovered due to web firewalls banning entry to those media websites or their unavailability all through the online. In these instances, the paper cites the report posted on the Iran Mission web site.

[29] See Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Greets Newest U.S. Sanctions with Mockery,” The New York Occasions, June 24, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/world/middleeast/iran-sanctions-response.html and “Venezuela Denounces New US Sanctions as ‘Menace’ to World,” Al Jazeera, August 6, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/venezuela-denounces-sanctions-threat-world-190806161739416.html

Throughout a interval of intense U.S. sanctions in opposition to Iranian oil exports, Tehran responded with scathing criticisms of those actions by way of state-controlled media and statements from authorities spokespersons. Equally, Venezuelan Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez criticized U.S. sanctions in opposition to Venezuela in August 2019 as a “international menace” in her personal public assertion in opposition to Washington.

[30]See “Trump Imposes Journey Ban on ‘Senior Iranian Officals’ and Household Members,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 26, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-travel-ban-iranian-senior-government-officials/30184344.html. Whereas the Trump administration’s journey restrictions on Iranian officers solely utilized to any hypothetical journey to the USA, the symbolic gesture behind these sanctions spotlight the extraordinary stress that Tehran’s officers face concerning their motion overseas.

[31] Sources embrace Paz Gómez, “A Timeline of US Sanctions on the Venezuelan Regime,”Econ Americas, June 3, 2019, https://econamericas.com/2019/06/us-sanctions-venezuela/; Jason Starr and HeliaIghani, “Timeline of U.S. Sanctions,” United States Institute of Peace: Iran Primer, up to date September 2019, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-sanctions; Clare RibandoSeelke, “Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions,” Congressional Analysis Service, up to date February 21, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10715.pdf; “Iran Sanctions,” U.S. Division of State, https://www.state.gov/iran-sanctions/; “Venezuela-Associated Sanctions,” U.S. Division of State, https://www.state.gov/venezuela-related-sanctions/.

[32] Michael R. Pompeo, “Confronting Iran: The Trump Administration’s Technique,” Overseas Affairs 97, no. 6 (November/December 2018): 66. Secretary of State Pompeo said that any assault by Iranian proxies on U.S. personnel or pursuits all through the Center East can be thought to be an act of aggression by Iran itself.

[33] Becca Wasser and Ariane Tabatabai, “Iran’s Community of Fighters within the Center East Aren’t At all times Loyal to Iran,” The Washington Put up, Might 21, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/21/how-do-irans-proxies-actually-work/. The authors state that Iran’s proxies should not a uniform, cohesive group with unwavering allegiance to Tehran, claiming that the nation doesn’t have sweeping, tight management over all of its proxies.

[34]Ibid. The authors additionally declare that the anomaly surrounding Iran’s assist to its proxies prevents policymakers from figuring out whether or not a proxy-led assault was straight mandated by Tehran or promoted by Iran.

[35]SirwanKajjo, Mehdi Jedinia, and EzeelSahinkya, “Why did Iran’s IRGC, Not its Proxies, Assault US Bases in Iraq?,” Voice of America, January 9, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/why-did-irans-irgc-not-its-proxies-attack-us-bases-iraq

[36]In a number of of those bilateral conferences, multiple subject was mentioned on the similar time. This paper sought to take care of consistency in its findings by categorizing every of those conferences by one subject. For multi-topic conferences, the research thought-about any discussions about anti-U.S. sentiment as taking highest precedence than different matters. One of many multi-topic conferences featured discussions about financial cooperation and enhancement of common bilateral ties. On this case, financial cooperation was favored above common bilateral ties for the reason that latter is commonly mentioned extensively all through a lot of the conferences.

[37] “Venezuela Hails Iran’s Combat In opposition to US’ Hegemony,” Iran Entrance Web page Information, June 30, 2018, https://ifpnews.com/venezuela-hails-irans-fight-against-us-hegemony

[38]See Jason Starr and HeliaIghani, “Timeline of U.S. Sanctions,” United States Institute of Peace: Iran Primer, up to date September 2019, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-us-sanctions

[39] “Iran, Venezuela Ink Pharmaceutical MoU,” Mehr Information Company, April 8, 2018, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/133217/Iran-Venezuela-ink-pharmaceutical-MoU

[40] “Iran Able to Export Drugs, Medical Gear to Venezuela,” Mehr Information Company, February 23, 2019, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/142811/Iran-ready-to-export-medicine-medical-equipment-to-Venezuela

[41] “Iran Exports Drugs to Venezuela,” Iran Worldwide, February 25, 2019, https://iranintl.com/en/iran-in-brief/iran-exports-medicine-venezuela

[42] Brandon Fite and Chloe Couhglin-Schulte, “U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competitors: The Affect of Latin America, Africa, and the Peripheral States,” Heart for Strategic and Worldwide Research, Burke Chair in Technique, July 9, 2013, 2, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120404_Iran_Chapter_XIII-Peripheral_States-Revised.pdf

[43] Ibid., 5.

[44] Norman A. Bailey, “Iran’s Venezuelan Gateway,” The American Overseas Coverage Council, February 2012, 1, https://www.afpc.org/uploads/documents/ISB5.pdf

[45] Dragan Stavljanin and Pete Baumgartner, “Persian May: How Sturdy is Iran’s Army?” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 9, 2020, https://www.rferl.org/a/persian-might-a-look-at-tehran-s-military-capability-amid-the-u-s–iranian-conflict/30368967.html

[46]VakkasDogantekin, “Iran Surrounded by Dozens of US Bases as Tensions Develop,” Anadolu Company, January 8, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-surrounded-by-dozens-of-us-bases-as-tension-grows/1696692

[47]Division of Protection,United States Southern Command Technique: Enduring Promise for the Americas, Might 8, 2019, 3,https://www.southcom.mil/Portals/7/Documents/SOUTHCOM_Strategy_2019.pdf?ver=2               019-05-15-131647-353


Written at: Georgetown College
Written for: Professor Fabiana Perera
Date written: Might 2020

Additional Studying on E-Worldwide Relations